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NUANCE AND COMPLEXITY IN REGULATORY
TAKINGS LAW
Gregory M. Stein*
[Presidential candidate John] Kerry also is a casualty of nuance-
itis, which is a kind of house mold prevalent in the north wing of
the Capitol.
-- George Will'
You're either with us or against us ....
-President George W. Bush2
[Bjalancing--or, better, the judicial practice of situated judgment




Firmness and certainty are in vogue. The most recent presidential election fea-
tured an incumbent President running as the more resolute candidate even in the
face of evidence that he had resolutely relied on poor advice; he derided his oppo-
nent's concern with considering both sides of an issue as "flip-flopping."4 The
intended implications of this view are that entertaining alternative ideas, rethinking
preliminary conclusions as evidence rolls in, displaying a willingness to admit mis-
takes, and holding a viewpoint that is non-absolutist are signs of weakness.5
* Woolf, McClane, Bright, Allen & Carpenter Distinguished Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Tennessee College of Law. J.D. Columbia 1986; A.B. Harvard 1983. I am grateful to
Professor Eric Kades and the William & Mary School of Law for sponsoring the inaugural
Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference and inviting me to participate; to Professor Frank
Michelman, whose scholarly work made that participation such an honor and a pleasure; and
to the University of Tennessee College of Law for providing summer research support.
' George F. Will, Capitol Plague: Why Kerry Suffers from Senate Politics, WASH. POST,
Sept. 16, 2004, at A31.
2 "You are either with us or against us," CNN.COM, Nov. 6, 2001, http://archives.cnn
.com/2001/US/11 /06/gen.attack.on.terror/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) (discussing the fight
against terrorism).
' Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1629 (1988) [hereinafter
Michelman, Takings].
4 Elisabeth Bumiller, Turnout Effort and Kerry, Too, Were G.O.P. 's Keys to Victory,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 4,2004, at Al.
I The 2004 election post-mortems emphasized this theme. See, e.g., id. ("Bush campaign
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It follows from these implications that a strong leader cannot harbor inconsistent
viewpoints, for hearing disagreement is the first step toward considering the merit of
alternative perspectives. Recognizing shades of gray is akin to conceding a fight, which
makes it a weakness not only to hold an opinion that is subject to qualification and ex-
ception, but even to acknowledge consideration of opposing points of view. One must
insulate oneself from nuance, whether in the Oval Office, on the stump, or on the living
room sofa. This rejection of complexity results in competing politicized news net-
works, a polarized electorate, and red and blue Americas, along with numerous mo-
mentous 5-4 Supreme Court decisions rendered over heated dissents.
Law professors, unshackled from the more typical roles of the attorney as advo-
cate or counselor, are unusually free to hold absolutist positions and to ruminate without
restraint. Once a lawyer enters the academy-and certainly once he or she is tenured-
there is little to tether that professor to "fair and balanced" reporting. Legal academics
need not persuade jurors, or voters, or electors, or even students and colleagues at their
own institutions, of anything, and they are welcome to espouse any view at all. If poli-
ticians and journalists can discredit or disregard opposing evidence, law professors
certainly can.
The sole restraint on law professors is the existence of a readership to be persuaded.
But for far too many academic writers, that audience is predisposed to agree with the
writer before reading the first word, through knowledge of an author's earlier work,
general agreement with the writer's views, and recognition that certain journals prefer
certain types of articles. Law professors may become complacent and sloppy, sensing
that their readership, like pre-screened audiences at certain political rallies, has been
culled of those who might challenge. By overlooking complexity and disregarding
nuance, an author can fortify an extreme case with which only a portion of the overall
reading public agrees. This accomplishment comes at the expense of persuading a
wider readership of the general validity of much of his or her argument. The house
mold of nuance-itis may not be prevalent enough in America's legal journals.
That is why it is such a refreshing pleasure to review the writing of Professor
Frank Michelman in the field of regulatory takings law over the last four decades.
Professor Michelman is not just a prolific and thoughtful author capable of composing
persuasive and articulate articles covering a wide range of subjects. He also is a writer
whose work is significantly strengthened by his willingness to recognize and address the
rigor of opposing arguments. Rather than detracting from his papers, these acknowl-
edgments of the soundness of competing analyses force Professor Michelman to refine
his reasoning, thereby making his own articles more convincing than they otherwise
might be. The reader of an article by Frank Michelman always feels fully confident that
officials said they were helped by the man they called a dream opponent, Senator John Kerry,
whose nuanced statements about Iraq gave them an opening, day after day, to attack him as
a 'flip-flopper."'); Kathleen Slocum, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 18,2004, at A30
("[T]here are many of us-almost 60 million, in fact, who voted for George W. Bush-who
believe that the world needs less 'nuance' and more resolve, strength[,] and unity .... ").
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the author has thought through the many layers of his argument, teased out the impli-
cations of every assertion he has made, conceded possible weaknesses and recognized
potential criticisms, responded thoughtfully, and respectfully invited those who disagree
to reply. He consistently demonstrates that this approach improves his case rather than
weakening it. And he always does so in lucid style, with great linguistic efficiency and
clear articulation.6 This Article will provide some illustrations of the rhetorical power
of nuance and complexity from the regulatory takings work of Professor Michelman.
I. NUANCE AND COMPLEXITY IN THE MIDST OF CATEGORICAL RULES
A stellar example of Professor Michelman's approach is found in his 1993 article
addressing some of the inconsistencies embedded within the United States Supreme
Court's then-most-recent regulatory takings opinion, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.7 The article, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas
and Judicial Conservatism, highlights the challenges that face judicially conservative
judges who wish to adhere concurrently to the principles of "the property project"-
more commonly referred to today as "the property rights movement"-and federalism.8
Conservative federal judges who might be inclined to favor property owners in regu-
latory takings disputes may be the same judges who exercise restraint both in evaluating
cases that fall within the province of the state courts and in overruling the decisions of
local land use bodies.9 Professor Michelman concedes that this is "an old story, after
all, ' ° even though Lucas had just been decided. 'The story in its broad outline is not
new," he continues." "My hope in these pages is to enrich it in detail and nuance."' 2
The simplistic approach to these contending arguments would be to argue "we're
right, they're wrong," as cable televisionjournalists, and far too many legal scholars, are
wont to do today. 13 But Professor Michelman goes three steps beyond this, first by con-
ceding that a parallel problem may face liberal jurists in the context of liberty interests,'4
6 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Precision, 39 TULSA L. REv. 639, 640 (de-
scribing one of Professor Michelman's articles as having "the highest idea-to-word ratio
of anything I have ever read by a law professor").
7 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
8 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas
and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301 (1993) [hereinafter Michelman,
Lucas and Conservatism].
9 See id. at 310-11.
10 Id. at 303.
I1 Id.
12 Id. More recent commentators continue to discuss issues of federalism in the regula-
tory takings context. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory
Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203 (2004).
13 Cf. Michelman, Lucas and Conservatism, supra note 8, at 306 (suggesting that the
"resurgence of federal judicial resolve" to protect property rights might be "normal" and not
"untoward").
" Id. at 303 ("A modem paradigm is the Warren Court pruning back federalism in the
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second by suggesting that "a conservative 'property' project [is] harder to bring off
than the liberal 'liberty' project,"' 5 and last in observing that judicial conservatives
might be attempting to resolve this predicament by seeking to nationalize the concept
of property by "pour[ing] naturalistic content" into it. 16 Instead of enlisting assertions
to gloss over complexity, Professor Michelman uses this complexity to strengthen his
argument. He acknowledges the merits of contrary views, observing that the similarities
between the two varieties of cases are incomplete and that conservative judges face
a more vexing conflict. 7
"Warren Court judicial liberals"' 8 were able to federalize, standardize, and elevate
certain liberty interests because lawyers view these liberty interests as "a category
whose scope and content are known independently of current legal facts."19 Property
concepts, however, are shaped and defined by law, and by a law that constantly is
evolving.2" Liberty, in short, is naturalistic, while property is positivistic.2 Moreover,
this positivistic property must be defined somewhere, and that somewhere is in the
statehouse and the state courthouse.22 Thus, "effective national judicial protection
for property must mean giving federal judges the last word on questions of the mean-
ings of laws emanating from state authorities. But this seems to be a gross contra-
vention of Our Federalism." 23
The solution, for the judicial conservative, is to "renaturaliz[e] constitutional
'property, a project that will nationalize property concepts by imbuing them with
fixed content. That, Professor Michelman concludes, is the process the Court was
attempting to initiate in Lucas, placing a thumb on the "property" end of the balance
and see-sawing the "federalism" side up into the air.25 If property law can be recon-
ceived as federal law, then striking down government actions as regulatory takings
protects property without impairing federalism. 26
A government takes property when it "perpetrates a departure from some then-
existent body of law, upon which the complaining party might appropriately have
relied as securing to him or her some property-based advantage, 27 and these bodies
field of race.").
" Id. at 304.
16 Id. at 307.
'7 See id. at 307, 309-11.
"8 Id. at 303.
19 Id. at 304.
20 Id. at 305.
2 Id. at 304-05.
22 Id. at 305.
23 Id. For a careful evaluation of the meaning of judicial conservatism in the context of
federalism opinions, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist
Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 429, 446-52 (2002).
24 Michelman, Lucas and Conservatism, supra note 8, at 307.
25 See id. at 314.
26 Id. at 320-21.
27 Id. at 309 (emphasis omitted).
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of law are bodies of state law. It is impossible, then, to determine whether a govern-
ment entity has taken property without knowing what the state defines as "property"
at the time the alleged taking occurred.28 This property standard not only is flexible,
but also permits for significant variation among the states.29
David Lucas claimed to have lost all or substantially all of the value of his property
as a result of the operation of South Carolina's new Beachfront Management Act.3°
While his two parcels undoubtedly retained only modest value after the Act became
effective, the Court could not assess the lots' depreciation without knowing their value
before South Carolina acted, and that value was a direct function of the state's property
law at the time." The Court also recognized a related point in its description of what
has come to be known as the nuisance exception and sent the case back to the state
courts for an assessment of what South Carolina's definition of property had encom-
passed prior to the Act's enactment.32
Professor Michelman wistfully imagines a feisty state court describing a system
of state property law that has evolved, that continues to evolve, and that puts owners
and their lawyers to the task of predicting what the owner's bundle of rights is and will
become over time.33 The question for that court then would be whether the con-
sequences of South Carolina's challenged beachfront management law are "fairly
prefigured by a prudent extrapolation of the precedential trajectories that are fairly
legible in the material."' Law is adaptive, not frozen, and must extend itself to meet
changing conditions.35
This imaginary approach would constitute a victory for state property law and fed-
eralism over the property rights movement. Professor Michelman argues that, as the
author of Lucas, "Justice Scalia needs to explain why he should consider himself and
his judicial colleagues any better qualified to answer [the question of what South
Carolina's property tradition actually is] ... than nine people picked at random from
the Charleston telephone book."36 The Court, of course, will have none of this, falling
back instead on a rule requiring the State to demonstrate that the banned activities
were already unlawful, an approach that serves to "nullify any principles of state
law that might possibly warrant a more complex conclusion than simple 'prohibition'
or 'dictation."' 37
28 Id. at 310.
29 Id. at 309-10.
30 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008-09 (1992). For a more detailed
description of the facts in Lucas, see id. at 1006-10.
3 See id. at 1008-09.
32 Id. at 1027-32; accord Michelman, Lucas and Conservatism, supra note 8, at 313-14.
31 Michelman, Lucas and Conservatism, supra note 8, at 314-16.
34 Id. at 315.
" Id. at 316; cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (discussing "the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" in the context of the
Eighth Amendment).
36 Michelman, Lucas and Conservatism, supra note 8, at 323.
31 Id. at 326.
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Professor Michelman yearns for a more searching analysis than the Court is will-
ing to provide. Lucas, after all, is a case in which the Court creates a categorical rule
in an area of the law otherwise occupied by multi-factor balancing tests.3" It was not
clear at the time whether Lucas was an aberration or the beginning of a new trend
toward over-simplicity in takings law. From the immediately post-Lucas perspective of
1993, "[w]e cannot tell yet how insistent the Supreme Court will be in this demand
for simple, yes-no, specificity and resolution-red light or green light but no yellow
(or yellow means green). '39 But if Lucas signaled a significant change of direction,
"its consequence is to federalize the law of land use in a peculiarly profound way....
[Lucas will] dictate to the States the jurisprudential spirit in which their general laws
of property and nuisance are to be read and construed, whether contained in legis-
lative enactments or judicial decisions."' This, Professor Michelman fears, might
lead states to shun appropriately complex principles in favor of more specific, more
simplistic rules.4
II. NUANCE, COMPLEXITY, AND THE QUESTION OF PUBLIC USE
Professor Michelman responded to comments by columnist William Safire in
a 1981 article entitled Properly as a Constitutional Right.42 While it is easier to incor-
porate layers of complexity in an academic article, itself based on a lecture, than in
a newspaper essay, the article serves to elucidate the ways in which snappy sound-
bites may capture attention while overlooking important subtleties.
Mr. Satire's column portrays the issue in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City
ofDetroi 3 as "the sanctity of private property." True enough, Professor Michelman
notes,45 but true of every takings case. The central issue in Poletown, as any student
of takings law will recall and as the United States Supreme Court itself recently re-
visited,46 is the question of what uses are sufficiently "public" that property may be
38 See generally Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528,536-40 (2005) (summariz-
ing various regulatory takings tests).
" Michelman, Lucas and Conservatism, supra note 8, at 327.
40Id.
41 Id.
42 Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 1097
(1981) [hereinafter Michelman, Constitutional Right].
43 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (per curiam). For a brief exposition of the facts of Pole-
town, see id. at 457. Poletown has since been overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
" William Safire, Poletown Wrecker's Ball, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1981, at A31.
41 Michelman, Constitutional Right, supra note 42, at 1098 ("I think Safire is right to spot
the Poletown case as one touching a very sensitive constitutional nerve." (italics added)).
' Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that takings for economic
development meet the constitutional "public use" standard).
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taken to further them. 47 "There are mysteries about the idea of constitutionally pro-
tected property rights of which Safire's essay displays no inkling. Some of those
mysteries I want to explore .... The exploration will lead us--or so I intend-to a
better way than Safire's of understanding the poignancy of Poletown.' 48
From this starting point, and with the luxury of more column-inches than most
journalists enjoy, Professor Michelman speculates about the sources on which judges
rely in determining whether a party actually holds a property right.49 Legal recog-
nition of property entitlements may arise from the reasonable investment-backed
expectations of owners, the popular perceptions held by laypersons, or the tradi-
tional body of common law. 0 All three of these methods demand that a judge look to
an external source to determine whether the entitlement merits legal protection." By
contrast, during the Lochner era, property rights were understood to be those entitled
to protection directly under the Constitution rather than by reference to an external
source of law. 2 These two approaches illustrate that we "are dealing with 'two conflict-
ing American ideals,' both reflected in the Constitution: 'the protection of popular
government on the one hand' and the protection of property rights on the other. 5 3
Courts face a conflict here similar to the clash between federalism and property rights
Professor Michelman would address head on twelve years later.5 4
Professor Michelman points out the tension between the "implicit premise of the
constitutional system that individual holdings are always subject to the risk of occasional
redistributions of values through the popularly ordained operations of government'" '55
and the "explicit premise of the system that people can have property, be owners, not
only as among themselves but also vis-a-vis the people as a whole organized as the
State."56 In so doing, he addresses the modem iteration of the question Justice Holmes
"' The Takings Clause states, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, withoutjust
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4 Michelman, Constitutional Right, supra note 42, at 1098 (italics added).
41 Id. at 1098-99.
50 Id. at 1099-100.
"' Id. at 1100. Note how portions of Professor Michelman's discussion here foreshadow
some of the observations about Lucas and the nuisance exception that he would make twelve
years later in Michelman, Lucas and Conservatism, supra note 8, discussed in Part I, supra.
52 Michelman, Constitutional Right, supra note 42, at 1101-02.
" Id. at 1109 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JuDIcIAL REVEw 86-87 (1980)).
' See supra Part I. This is a topic Professor Michelman also discussed elsewhere. E.g.,
Frank I. Michelman, Mr. Justice Brennan: A Property Teacher's Appreciation, 15 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 296, 298-99 (1980) [hereinafter Michelman, Justice Brennan] ("Federalism...
is a device both for curbing remote and unaccountable power and for nurturing self-development
through substantial participation in political life. In a parallel view, property would both assure
the necessary material foundation for political competence and provide a haven for self-
determination and self-expression. The two ideas are thus related, complementary.").
55 Michelman, Constitutional Right, supra note 42, at 1110.
56 Id.
395
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faced in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon." And he once again rejects the simplistic
view that this is a simple yes-or-no question, especially in cases-such as Poletown-
in which the compensation remedy cannot solve the problem.58
The solution, he submits, is found in "seek[ing] a rapprochement of property and
popular sovereignty in the idea that rights under a political constitution, including prop-
erty rights, are first of all to be regarded as political rights."" Mr. Safire laments that
while "we are encouraging the Poles in Poland to turn toward capitalism, it is ironic
to have Americans in Poletown facing expropriation of their property."' The question
is not, however, whether Detroit is permitted to take its residents' land (which it plainly
is) but whether it may do so to help General Motors assemble a large tract for a new
plant,6 and the answer is heavily shaded. Thus, notes Professor Michelman, "it is a
mistake to see property-as I gather William Safire sees it-as something categori-
cally apart from-beyond the reach of-political action. ' '12 Instead, individual par-
ticipation in the political process and regular give-and-take between citizens and their
government will define and continually redefine the moving target of property.63
Property rights are political rights. They guarantee that a person feels a part of
the community and a fully-constituted citizen and individual,64 and they allow that
person to participate in the ongoing process of defining what property is. The problem
in Poletown is not simply that the Michigan Supreme Court favors popular govern-
ment over the protection of property rights, as Mr. Safire argues.65 Rather, it is the
more subtle and refined view that
17 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an
implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation
must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone.").
58 See Michelman, Constitutional Right, supra note 42, at 1108-10.
'9 Id. at 1112.
' Safire, supra note 44.
61 See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455,458 (Mich.
1981) (per curiam), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787
(Mich. 2004).
62 Michelman, Constitutional Right, supra note 42, at 1112.
63 See id. Note, however, that this moving target cannot be permitted to move too quickly,
for "'sudden changes in the major elements and crucial determinants of one's established posi-
tion in the world' may constitute takings. Id. at 1113 (quoting Michelman, Justice Brennan,
supra note 54, at 306). This comment seems to echo the Court's then-recent exploration of
the concept of "investment-backed expectations" in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-27 (1978).
6' See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957,959 (1982)
("Most people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves. These objects are
closely bound up with personhood because they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as
continuing personal entities in the world.").
65 Satire, supra note 44 ("Why are we so reluctant, in these rights-minded times, to defend
property rights? Possession of land or valuables is nothing to be ashamed of or to feel guilty
about; we should lustily own up to ownership.").
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the obliteration of Poletown and the rupture of its society, with or
without payments of money to the former inhabitants, may bear on
their identity and efficacy as participants in the politics of Detroit,
of Michigan, of the United States, in which are constantly being
forged the conditions in which their, and our, future identity and
efficacy will be determined.66
IH. NUANCE, COMPLEXITY, AND PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
As part of the Republican Party's "Contract with America," Congressional leaders
proposed several property rights laws soon after beginning their term in 1995.67 In three
published works an article, a response, and a reprint of his testimony before the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works6 -Professor Michelman addresses
this legislation, criticizing it in his testimony as "rest[ing] on a mistakenly oversim-
plified, a mistakenly purist, view of the place of private property rights, basic and im-
portant as those certainly are, in our full constitutional scheme. 69
Once again, and in this more highly politicized context, he attempts to strike a
proper balance between political rights and property rights, demonstrating his willing-
ness to embrace complexity rather than relaxing his analysis. The proposed legislation
aimed to support the freedom of owners to use their property in any way they wish
more vigorously than it defended the ability of government to safeguard the public
interest.7 ° "Such private-property absolutism is, however, contrary to historic American
constitutional understanding; and without the absolutist premise to support them,
'property rights' laws themselves lack any robust public justification."'"
Professor Michelman does not deny the constitutionality of the two proposed
laws he discusses in his testimony and his article.72 Rather, he focuses on the substance
66 Michelman, Constitutional Right, supra note 42, at 1113.
67 See Frank I. Michelman, A Skeptical View of "Property Rights " Legislation, 6 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 409,409 (1995) [hereinafter Michelman, Skeptical View].
68 Frank I. Michelman, A Brief Response to Richard Epstein, 49 WASH. U.J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 25 (1996) [hereinafter Michelman, Response to Epstein]; Michelman, Skeptical
View, supra note 67; Frank I. Michelman, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Envi-
ronment and Public Works, June 2 7, 1995, 49 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 1 (1996)
[hereinafter Michelman, Testimony] (reprinting text of his testimony).
69 Michelman, Testimony, supra note 68, at 1.
70 Professor Michelman unquestionably views this disagreement as a conflict between
personal freedom and governmental responsibility. See id. at 8 (opining that one of the
statutes "posits an overriding constitutional and moral commitment in this country to a level
and sweep of proprietary freedom that decidedly outranks and subordinates the respon-
sibilities of public government").
" Id. at 2; see also Michelman, Response to Epstein, supra note 68, at 25-26 (rebutting
the claim that "such a rigid, sweeping, and governmentally crippling rule... is demanded by
an American constitutional commitment to respect and protect private property").
72 See Michelman, Skeptical View, supra note 67, at 420; Michelman, Testimony, supra
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of the bills and weighs their protections for the two stakes potentially in conflict: the
property rights of an owner and the public interest responsibilities of elected govern-
ment.73 Congress, acting in partisan fashion, selected the former as more worthy of pro-
tection, with this protection necessarily coming at the expense of the latter. Professor
Michelman sees the many layers to the issue, which is "closely bound up with the
question of how our Constitution has historically been understood to command both
a due regard for private property and a due regard for representative government's
capacity for vigorous pursuit of environmental and other public interests."74
The bills' supporters claimed that their proposals righted a wrong, rebalancing out-
of-kilter scales in a way that would restore fairness and compensate those whose prop-
erty has been taken by majoritarian inequity.75 Professor Michelman recasts the bills
as "sometimes send[ing money] to these owners, in circumstances where courts apply-
ing the Constitution alone would have allowed them nothing."76 Stated more baldly,
the proposals create transfer payments from the public at large to a small group of prop-
erty owners.77 "To many who take a skeptical view of property rights legislation,
it seems that to require in this way the handing over of public funds to private owners
whose activities are restricted by otherwise valid laws.., is tantamount to giving
away public money for no good public reason. '"7
By rephrasing the issue in this way, Professor Michelman presents a second view
of the legislation, one that causes the undecided reader to wonder which of these two
seemingly inconsistent positions more accurately describes pending legislation that
is not constitutionally mandated. From this point forward, the reader's assumption,
which the article will bear out, becomes that the reality is a highly complex mixture
of two contending perspectives. The reader must synthesize his or her own conclusion
after pondering these two plausible competing alternatives.
In the other articles examined above,79 Professor Michelman placed himself in
the role of mediator, considering the merits and flaws of opposing arguments, illus-
trating the attractive but misleading simplicity in each, and attempting to demonstrate
how the consideration and melding of opposing arguments enriches discourse. Here,
note 68, at 4.
13 See Michelman, Skeptical View, supra note 67, at 411-13; Michelman, Testimony,
supra note 68, at 4-5.
7" Michelman, Testimony, supra note 68, at 4-5 (emphasis omitted). He proceeds to call
this point "crucial to my testimony." Id. at 5.
" See id. at 7 (noting that supporters of these bills view property rights as "judicially
under-protected").
76 Id. at 5.
71 See id. (noting that a "very narrow segment" of the population would enjoy the bills'
protections).
78 Id. at 7; see also Michelman, Skeptical View, supra note 67, at 413 ("What is supposed
to justify conferral of this benefit at taxpayer expense on these statutorily sculpted subsets
of citizens?").
'9 See supra Parts I, H.
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although his long-run goals appear to be the same-demonstrating the shallowness
of arguments that may initially seem appealing and encouraging the embracing of
complexity-his means of attaining those goals are necessarily different.80 This is
Congressional testimony, after all, and it is testimony on highly politicized bills that had
just been proposed by a new legislative majority that believed it had assumed control
on the strengths of its appeals to the public. Not only is he seeking to influence impor-
tant legislation, he is attempting to provide a sensible and credible viewpoint that the
proponents of the legislation may see as contrary to the argument that vaulted them
to power.8
The "property rights" viewpoint is that protective legislation such as these two
bills "is required and justified by respect for private property rights... [that currently
are] under-protected rights";82 that "the Constitution really does in principle demand
absolute protection" 3 for these rights; and that these rights are "moral rights whose
absolute protection is demanded by principles at the root of American constitu-
tionalism."' Professor Michelman' s goal in the remainder of his testimony is to pro-
vide support for the alternative position, so that Congress will consider these competing
perspectives and attempt to combine them into a more coherent, nuanced whole before
taking action. 5 Rather than giving property rights "to-the-hilt insulation... frompublic
concerns," he argues, thoughtful lawmakers will insist on "a much more sensitive medi-
ation between two fundamental constitutional principles: respect for private property,
and respect for representative government's responsibility to discern and secure impor-
tant interests of the commonwealth or of the public considered as a whole.,8 6
Parsing Lucas87 once again, Professor Michelman notes the points of disconnection
between Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority and the proposed takings legislation. 8
The Lucas Court stressed how the boundaries of takings law must be guided by citizens'
understandings of the ingredients of property rights and how those rights necessarily
are restricted on occasion as the state exercises its police power.8 9 In other words, we
must "treat the bulk of these [disputed takings] as belonging to the normal give-and-
take of a progressive, dynamic, democratic society, an ordinary part of the background
of risk and opportunity against which we all take our chances in our roles as investors
80 See Michelman, Testimony, supra note 68, at 15.
81 See id.
82 Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
83 Id.
4 id.
85 Id. at 15 (encouraging Congress to find "fair formulas for compensability").
86 Id. at 8-9; see also Michelman, Skeptical View, supra note 67, at 416 (recounting "[t]he
tradition.., of a law of property that is functionally oriented to contemporary community goals,
as well as to protection of private advantage, and that relies on the police powers of legislatures,
alongside common law adjudication by courts, to negotiate and mediate between the two").
87 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
88 Michelman, Testimony, supra note 68, at 9-12.
89 Id. at 10-11.
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in property."' He sees in Justice Scalia's opinion "a deep and ancient tradition of ex-
pected regard for other people's and the public's interest and concerns when you make
use of your property."'" For these reasons, Professor Michelman questions, and suggests
that Justice Scalia also would question, "the central premise---the absolutistic property-
rights premise-underlying the proposed legislation. 92
Perhaps more strongly than in any of his other published works on takings law,
Professor Michelman argues in favor of a particular position in these pieces. 93 He un-
doubtedly holds his own opinions about this legislation, which differ from the views
of the majority of the members of Congress to whom he is speaking.94 But instead
of attempting a "my-position-is-superior-to-yours" approach, he seeks to persuade his
listeners that a melding of his views and theirs will lead to policies that better advance
the public interest.9 He is not so much arguing in favor of a particular viewpoint as
he is making it available to his listeners and readers.' He encourages them to hear the
two discordant approaches, select the portions of each that are coherent, and fuse them
into a workable whole.97 Oversimplified legislation is not up to the task of resolv-
ing a quandary as vexing as this one: "The problem is obstreperously, recalcitrantly
multi-factorial and contextual. It can only be handled at a more retail level, as courts
have done with the balancing test."98
LV. NUANCE AND COMPLEXITY IN PROPERTY, UTILITY, AND FAIRNESS
Professor Michelman's best-known work certainly is Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law.99 On
90 Id. at 11.
91 Id. at 12.
92 Id. at 15.
9 See supra notes 67-68.
4 See Michelman, Skeptical View, supra note 67, at 409-10.
9' Professor Michelman makes no bones about his distaste for absolutism of this type. See
id. at 413-14 (noting that, instead of honestly arguing for these bills on policy grounds, sup-
porters instead "claim a loftier, more peremptory ground: that of constitutional morality and
obligation"). To his credit, he does not seek to expound any such absolutist views of his own.
96 See Michelman, Testimony, supra note 68, at 15 (suggesting that problems of this type
demand finely tailored solutions).
9' See id.
98 Id.; see also Michelman, Skeptical View, supra note 67, at 416 (noting how the consti-
tutional compact the Court identified in Lucas "contain[s] other terms that tend, whether this
pleases us or not, to make regulatory takings claims hard to deal with reasonably by any kind
of categorical rule"); id. at 420 ("In part, the problem is the cheapening of the rhetorics of
property, conscience, and compact. It likely is not a long-run service to constitutional govern-
ment to misuse them so flagrantly.").
9 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967) [hereinafter Michelman,
Property, Utility]. Recent citation surveys confirm the influence of this article. See Fred R.
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just the second page of the article--one of his earliest published works-he establishes
the pattern to which he will adhere in many of his later academic writings, by de-
scribing apparently conflicting views of the regulatory takings conundrum as "different
versions of the same truth."'t1 0 Already, he is welcoming disparate views and attempt-
ing to highlight their similarities while synthesizing their differences. Although he
claims-too modestly-to make no "efforts to arrive at a systematic restatement of
legal doctrine, or to reformulate doctrine, redirect it, or overhaul it,"',' this early work
already demonstrates Professor Michelman' s trademark precision and sophistication.
Professor Michelman makes his own perspective clear in this article, just as he
later will do much more directly in his Senate testimony.' 2 But rather than using his
own words to subdue those who hold opposing opinions, he finds the strengths in these
counterpoints and manages to unify them with his own views, to merge them into a
better whole. He also shows an uncanny ability in this 1967 article to predict the sub-
issues within regulatory takings law that would become contentious in the coming
years and to zero in on truths that seem self-evident today but were far more disputed
at the time he was writing. 3 In fact, one of the reasons they seem so undeniable now
is that this article has become part of "the understandings of our citizens regarding
the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that they acquire when
they obtain title to property,"'"' and thus part of the background of takings law against
which contemporary authors write.
This warm reception of complexity is evidenced by Professor Michelman' s dis-
cussion of the term "property" itself, in the context of physical invasions."'0 In his
summary description of some of the earliest takings cases, including those address-
ing straightforward physical occupations, he begins with a direct assertion that most
laypersons would accept: "'Property' suggests a thing owned, and 'taking' suggests
physical appropriation."" In a footnote, however, he clarifies that "[s]uch usage is
not fashionable in academic circles, where there is a preference for a more sophisti-
cated use of 'property' to denote legal relations among persons with respect to things,
rather than the things themselves which are the 'subjects of property."", 0 7
Writing in a venue that will appeal to only the most intrepid non-lawyer, he takes
great care here to remind his readership-primarily law professors, judges, and
Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540, 1550 (1985) (listing
article as eighth most-cited); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited,
71 CH.-KENT L. REv. 751, 767 (1996) (listing article as twelfth most-cited).
'00 Michelman, Property, Utility, supra note 99, at 1166.
'0' Id. at 1167.
102 See supra Part III.
'03 See, e.g., Michelman, Property, Utility, supra note 99, at 1233-34 (anticipating con-
ceptual severance problem that courts continue to address).
'0 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
o See Michelman, Property, Utility, supra note 99, at 1185-86.
'o6 Id. at 1185 (footnote omitted).
'o Id. at 1185 n.41.
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lawyers- that "property" may mean something different to them than it does to most
others."' 8 This may be an admonition to the reader more familiar with legal termi-
nology that laypersons often lack the technical training necessary to recognize some
of the nuances of an important legal term; just as likely, it is a warning to legal experts
that they need to pay closer heed to popular conceptions about the law of property. Any
reasonably proficient academic could construct a plausible argument limiting the Fifth
Amendment compensation requirement to physical appropriations, but that argument
would fail the straight-face test many non-lawyers would apply. Even for lawyers, the
argument is a weak one, for "[w]ordplay-in short dogged adherence to the constitu-
tional formulas of 'taking' and 'property'-cannot justify any sharp line of distinction"
between physical takings and negative limitations.1°9
Judicial decisions in this area may sometimes produce results "surprising to the
uninitiated," 10 but even the experienced scholar will find it difficult to synthesize some
of the Court's work-product and fit the latest case into the provisional model that
seemed to make sense until that case shook its foundations. "It is understandable, there-
fore, that the energies of legal scholars should have focused on analysis and rational-
ization .... ""' Professor Michelman, however, hopes to perform a different task here.
His goal is to establish fairness as the yardstick by which the need for compensation
is assessed. 2 He also uses this fairness critique as a springboard for importing eco-
nomics concepts into regulatory takings law, thereby adding further complexity to
the discussion." 3
Before he can reach the core of his argument, Professor Michelman first must exam-
ine the nature of property.114 Turning from the "deck clearing [of refuting some of the
08 He also takes care to raise this same issue when writing for an audience consisting largely
of lawyers and scholars who are not American. See Frank Michelman, Construing Old Constitu-
tional Texts: Regulation of Use as "Taking" of Property in United States Constitutional
Jurisprudence, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE UNDER OLD CONSTITUTIONS 227, 244 (Eivind
Smith ed., 1995) (advising the reader that the Supreme Court's "members doubtless feel some
responsibility for adjudicating in ways conducive to sustained public confidence in the lawful
and constitutional character of governance in the United States-in the integrity of the system
of laws and in the sincerity and reliability of 'the historical compact,"' and referring in the next
paragraph to the Court's "share of responsibility for the country's constitutional morale").
'09 Michelman, Property, Utility, supra note 99, at 1186-87.
110 Id. at 1169. Again, the "uninitiated" may include lawyers less familiar with the American
legal system. See Frank I. Michelman, Socio-Political Functions of Constitutional Protection
for Private Property Holdings (In Liberal Political Thought), in PROPERTY LAW ON THE
THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 433, 444 (G.E. van Maanen & A.J. van der Walt eds.,
1996) ("At least to an Americanized ear, then, a call for 'constitutional protection for private
property' can only be one forjudicial protection of holdings against government actions that
would reduce them or their value as gauged by what is claimed to be the existing law.").
"' Michelman, Property, Utility, supra note 99, at 1170.
..2 See id. at 1171-72.
13 See id. at 1173-83.
114 Id. at 1203.
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extant tests] to theory building or, more accurately, to theory hunting,"' 15 he scrutinizes
property owners' expectations, a study that foreshadows the Court's discussion of this
topic in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City."6 Professor Michelman
also reminds us that property is not just a "thing owned,"' " nor is it merely "legal re-
lations among persons with respect to things."" 8 Now we also must consider the tem-
poral dimension of property-its duration, whether "an existing distribution should
normally have a degree of permanence"l--a question he describes as fundamental.
20
The issue is not just what legal rights the owner possesses at any time, but how long she
reasonably may assume these rights will endure without significant legal redefinition. 2'
"Property, then, is a conventionally recognized stability of possession .... 122
With these cards carefully dealt, Professor Michelman now can play out the hand.
In detailed mathematical fashion, he describes for the first time his compensation equa-
tion, one that balances the efficiency gains to be garnered by government action, the
settlement costs a government will incur if it decides to compensate, and the demorali-
zation costs a failure to compensate would bring about. 23 Although the article is fre-
quently cited today for this detailed algebraic proposition, it is worth remembering
that in the immediately succeeding section he adds yet another layer of particularity by
tying the discussion of compensation and utility to John Rawls's principle of "'justice
as fairness."",124 Under a fairness analysis,
[a] decision not to compensate is not unfair as long as the
disappointed claimant ought to be able to appreciate how such
"1 Id. at 1202-03.
116 438 U.S. 104, 123-27 (1978). The Penn Central Court cites Professor Michelman's
article twice. Id. at 128.
117 Michelman, Property, Utility, supra note 99, at 1185; see supra text accompanying
note 106.
118 Michelman, Property, Utility, supra note 99, at 1185 n.4 1; see supra text accompany-
ing note 107.
119 Michelman, Property, Utility, supra note 99, at 1203; see also Frank I. Michelman,
Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional Method, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 91, 100-01 (1992)
[hereinafter Michelman, Liberties] ("[In a common-law based 'culture of property,' the possi-
bility of change, of evolution, is 'always understood.' For these or other reasons, a democratic
constitution may well leave the precise contours of property protection, or some of them, to
ongoing political hammering-out within rather broad limits." (citations omitted)).
20 Michelman, Property, Utility, supra note 99, at 1203.
121 See id. at 1210.
122 Id. In this portion of his analysis, Professor Michelman relies heavily on the work of
David Hume. See generally id. at 1208-11, 1209 n.94.
123 Id. at 1214-18.
124 Id. at 1219 (citing three different works by John Rawls); see also id. at 1181 (describ-
ing the need to consider the government's distribution function, as isolated from its allocation
function, as "intellectually most satisfying and productive").
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decisions might fit into a consistent practice which holds forth a
lesser long-run risk to people like him than would any consistent
practice which is naturally suggested by the opposite decision.'
We now can see what issues the utilitarian and justice-as-fairness modes of anal-
ysis force us to address, and the question becomes whether these two approaches
to the takings puzzle lead to the same results. 2 6 The answer turns out to be a condi-
tional "yes."'27 The property owner who is refused compensation might be somewhat
mollified if a decision to deny this remedy meets the utilitarian criteria for non-
compensation.1 28 But the owner's reaction "will depend on the behavioral assump-
tions which are plugged into the utilitarian equation, and on whether utilitarian
decision makers are required to assume that their decisions will be widely publicized
and sensitively construed."' 2 9 This owner is most likely to accept the absence of com-
pensation, then, when regulatory takings decisions are broadly disseminated and under-
stood.'3° The diffusion of legal knowledge presumably would have helped to shape her
expectations in the first place, making a decision not to compensate less surprising.
Similarly, the failure to compensate her will help to shape the expectations of future
participants in the property marketplace, thereby leading to greater predictability and
less disappointment going forward. In these instances, utilitarianism andjustice as fair-
ness lead to similar outcomes.'
Professor Michelman does not shy away from complexity, building two distinct
and detailed models that he shows will converge on a single solution when certain
conditions are met. 32 He then is able to apply these models to the actual case law.133
As a means of validating his proposed test, he demonstrates that much of the Court's
takings jurisprudence conforms to his structure, while indicating those areas where
there is discordance between the two. 1
34
The article also shows the dangers of conceptually severing a property estate into
component sub-estates, a process Professor Michelman describes as "functional division
of spatially unitary property."' 35 In addition, he notes the superficial attractiveness and
125 Id. at 1223.
126 See id.
127 See id.
12 See id. at 1221-22.
129 Id. at 1223.
130 Id. at 1224.
' See id. at 1223-24.
132 See id.
'3 See id. at 1224-45.
134 id.
' Id. at 1234; see Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,419 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (noting that assessment of diminution in value will be difficult because "values are
relative" and "[t]he rights of an owner as against the public are not increased by dividing the
interests in his property into surface and subsoil"). See generally Margaret Jane Radin, The
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hidden dangers of a test that relies on the illusory distinction between the prevention of
nuisances and the creation of public benefits.136 A rule that rests the decision whether
to compensate on that definitional difference risks focusing on a false target: "Such
a rule has overgeneralized from relevant considerations which are somewhat character-
istic of, but not logically or practically inseparable from, measures in one or the other
class."'37 Glossing over complexity in this way can lead to unjust results, and "[i]f the
relevant considerations can be kept in view without the oversimplified rule, then the
oversimplified rule is merely a menace to just decision and should be dismissed.' 38
The legal-realist critique of common-law judging has never been far below the sur-
face in the area of regulatory takings law, and it is to this final complexity that Professor
Michelman turns near the close of his article. "Fairness... is a subtle compound,
whose presence in any given situation we can often sense.., but only through a mental
chemistry hard to reconstruct except through impressionistic, almost conclusory dis-
course."' 139 This standards-based means of judging does not sit well with those who
seek harder-edged rules to guide and bind judicial discretion. 40 Not only may the use
of standards lead to impenetrably dense opinions, it also can cause the reader to wonder
or fear precisely what is directing a case's outcome.
Perhaps, Professor Michelman suggests, judicial discretion truly is being guided by
a search for fairness, given the imperfect alternatives available.'4 ' But even if we find
a fairness standard to be an appropriate guidepost, "we need to search... for some
workable, impersonal rule believed to approximate in a useful proportion of cases the
same result that fairness would dictate."'42 The danger of this approach, once again, is
Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 1667, 1676 (1988) (defining the term "conceptual severance" to mean "delineating a
property interest consisting ofjust what the government action has removed from the owner, and
then asserting that that particular whole thing has been permanently taken").
136 Michelman, Property, Utility, supra note 99, at 1238.
137 id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1249.
"' See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577 (1988)
(contrasting "hard-edged" rules with more ambiguous standards for decision); cf. Frank
Michelman, The Common Law Baseline and Restitution for the Lost Commons: A Reply to
Professor Epstein, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 59 (1997) (questioning Professor Epstein's assertion
that "a common law baseline for unconstitutional property encroachment... promises... the
kind of rigor and objectivity required for effective judicial restraint of majoritarian excess
without undue politicization of the judiciary").
141 See Michelman, Property, Utility, supra note 99, at 1249-50; cf. Michelman, Takings,
supra note 3, at 1622, 1625 (observing that "[tihere are further signs in recent developments
that the Court is finding its open-ended balancing posture hard to maintain and so is moving
noticeably towards a reformalization of regulatory-takings doctrine," but concluding that
this arises from the Court's inability "to reconcile private property... with democracy").
142 Michelman, Property, Utility, supra note 99, at 1250. He refers to this search as
"doctrinal packaging." Id.
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that it creates just another false target, as judges apply a rule that approximates their
desired standard instead of directly applying the standard itself, a method that will lead
to wrong decisions in those instances in which the rule and the standard diverge.
CONCLUSION
Regulatory takings law-the "hunt for the quark"' 43-is not an area of inquiry that
is well-suited to those who seek simplistic solutions. The quest for black-letter rules
and straightforward tests is a noble one, but it has not yet succeeded in this field and
perhaps never will. Rather, the ideal judge or scholar engages in balancing and rebal-
ancing, constantly recalibrating as unanticipated fact situations and fresh ideas are
added to the mix. Initial impressions regularly prove to be wrong, and the capacity to
reconsider one's earlier positions in light of later developments is an essential attri-
bute of the first-rate takings scholar orjudge.'" Similarly necessary is a recognition
that good arguments may be scattered among divergent views.'45
This makes regulatory takings law an ideal field, though not the only ideal one,'"
for Professor Michelman. His willingness to acknowledge the strengths of opposing
perspectives, his respect for those holding different viewpoints, 47 and his clear and arti-
culate exposition of his arguments are well suited to this treacherous area of the law.
The academic work of Frank Michelman has helped to advance the understanding of
the complex and highly nuanced world of regulatory takings law, a fact that many
thousands of readers-law students, lawyers, law professors, policy makers,judges,
and Justices-have recognized from the time they first tackled it.
143 CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON
THE USE, MISUSE, AND RE-USE OF URBAN LAND 875 (4th ed. 1989) (observing that "[t]he
attempt to distinguish 'regulation' from 'taking' is the most haunting jurisprudential problem
in the field of contemporary land-use law--one that ... may be the lawyer's equivalent of
the physicist's hunt for the quark").
'" 'There is no way of putting a stop to the endless succession of hard cases-cases that,
being fairly debatable either way under today's corpus of constitutional law, require for their
disciplined resolution a new elaboration of constitutional principle that becomes a part of
tomorrow's corpus." Frank I. Michelman, Constancy to an Ideal Object, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv.
406, 414 (1981).
14' As Professor Michelman notes in a somewhat different context, "A myth is not a
falsehood, it is a warped truth." Michelman, Liberties, supra note 119, at 107.
'" See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Four-
teenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969).
141 See, e.g., Michelman, Liberties, supra note 119, at 92 (writing, in a response to an
article by Professor Richard Epstein, "Professor Epstein, as usual, argues his case with vigor
and rigor. As usual, illumination results. We see normative shapes, structures, symmetries-
contestable as many of us find them-where before we had not glimpsed their possibility.").
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